Atomic Crosschain Transaction technology allows composable programming across private Ethereum blockchains. It allows for inter-contract and inter-blockchain function calls that are both synchronous and atomic: if one part fails, the whole call graph of function calls is rolled back. It is not based on existing techniques such as Hash Time Locked Contracts, relay chains, block header transfer, or trusted intermediaries. BLS Threshold Signatures are used to prove to validators on one blockchain that information came from another blockchain and that a majority of the validators of that blockchain agree on the information. Coordination Contracts are used to manage the state of a Crosschain Transaction and as a repository of Blockchain Public Keys. Dynamic code analysis and signed nested transactions are used together with live argument checking to ensure execution only occurs if the execution results in valid state changes. Contract Locking and Lockability enable atomic updates.
I. INTRODUCTION
Atomic Crosschain Transactions [1] for permissioned Ethereum blockchains [2] allow for inter-contract and interblockchain function calls that are both synchronous and atomic. Atomic Crosschain Transactions are special nested Ethereum transactions that include additional fields to facilitate the atomic behaviour securely. The technology has been designed to shield application developers from the complexity of crosschain transactions by incorporating the required changes into the Ethereum Client software. Fig. 1 shows a system of blockchains. Enterprises are indicated by the colour of lines between two blockchains. For example, the enterprise represented by the green lines has nodes on blockchains A, C, D, X, and Y; the enterprise represented by the blue lines has nodes on blockchains A, B, D, and X; and the enterprise represented by the red lines has nodes on all blockchains. Using Atomic Crosschain Transaction technology, an enterprise can create a crosschain transaction who's call graph can traverse any blockchain they have a node on. The Coordination Blockchains are used to hold the cross transaction state. All nodes on all blockchains processing a crosschain transaction need to be able to access the Coordination Blockchain referenced in a crosschain transaction. Fig. 2 shows code fragments from two contracts on two blockchains. The function funcA in contract ConA on Private Blockchain A calls the function funcB in contract ConB on Private Blockchain B. Atomic Crosschain Transactions allow the crosschain function call to occur synchronously and atomically. By synchronously it is meant that function calls that return results can be executed and the results are immediately available and that all execution will complete and updates will be committed prior to the end of the Atomic Crosschain Transaction. By atomic it is meant that the updates are either applied on both blockchains, or the updates are discarded on both blockchains.
Atomic Crosschain Transactions technology does not rely on Time Hash Lock Contracts [3], relay chains [4] , block header relaying [5] , [6] , or trusted intermediaries. It is a new technique which brings together BLS Threshold Signatures, nested transactions, and dynamic parameter checking against expected signed values, and a Coordination Blockchain as a holder of crosschain transaction state and as a time-out time reference.
Section II Components describes the concepts behind the technology. Section III Transaction Processing walks through happy case and failure case transaction processing. Section IV Application Development discusses considerations that should be considered when creating applications with this technology. Section V Analysis describes the Safety and Liveness properties of this technology.
Source code for this technology is available on github.com [7] .
II. COMPONENTS A. Nested Transactions
Atomic Crosschain Transactions are nested Ethereum transactions and views. Transactions are function calls that update state. Views are function calls that return a value but do not update state. Fig. 3 shows an Externally Owned Account (EOA) calling a function funcA in contract ConA [9] , [10] combines the ideas of threshold cryptography [11] with Boneh-Lynn-Shacham(BLS) signatures [12] , and uses a Pedersen commitment scheme [13] to ensure verifiable secret sharing. The scheme allows any M validator nodes of the total N validator nodes on a blockchain to sign messages in a distributed way such that the private key shares do not need to be assembled to create a signature. Each validator node creates a signature share by signing the message using their private key share. Any M of the total N signature shares can be combined to create a valid signature. Importantly, the signature contains no information about which nodes signed, or what the threshold number of signatures (M) needed to create the signature is.
The Atomic Crosschain Transaction system uses BLS Threshold Signatures to prove that information came from a specific blockchain. For example, in Fig. 3 
F. Crosschain Coordination
Crosschain Coordination Contracts exist on Coordination Blockchains. They allow validator nodes to determine whether the provisional state updates related to the Originating Transaction and Subordinate Transactions should be committed or discarded. The contract is also used to determine a common time-out for all blockchains, and as a repository of Blockchain Public Keys.
Fig. 5: Multichain Nodes
When a user creates a Crosschain Transaction, they specify the Coordination Blockchain and Crosschain Coordination Contract to be used for the transaction, and the time-out for the transaction in terms of a block number on the Coordination Blockchain. The validator node that they submit the Originating Transaction to (the Originating Node) works with other validator nodes on the blockchain to sign a Crosschain Transaction Start message. This message is submitted to the Crosschain Coordination Contract to indicate to all nodes on all blockchains that the Crosschain Transaction has commenced.
When the Originating Node has received Subordinate Transaction Ready messages for all Subordinate Transactions, it works with other validator nodes to create a Crosschain Transaction Commit message. This message is submitted to the Crosschain Coordination Contract to indicate to all nodes on all blockchains that the Crosschain Transaction has completed and all provisional updates should be committed. If an error is detected, then a Crosschain Transaction Ignore message is created and submitted to the Crosschain Coordination Contract to indicate to all nodes on all blockchains that the Crosschain Transaction has failed and all provisional updates should be discarded. Similarly, if the transaction times-out, all provisional updates will be discarded.
G. Contract Locking and Provisional State Updates
When a contract is first deployed it is marked as a Lockable Contract or a Nonlockable Contract. A Nonlockable Contract, the default, is one which can not be locked. When a node attempts to update the state of a contract given an Originating or Subordinate Transaction, it checks whether the contract is Lockable and whether it is locked. The transaction fails if the contract is Nonlockable or if the contract is Lockable but is locked. Figure 6 shows the locking state transitions for a contract. The Crosschain Coordination Contract will be in Started state. The act of mining an Originating Transaction or Subordinate Transaction and including it in a blockchain locks the contract. The contract is unlocked when the Crosschain Coordination 
H. Crosschain Transaction Fields
Originating Transactions, Subordinate Transactions, and Subordinate Views contain the fields shown in Table I . Some of the information in the standard Ethereum transaction fields are exposed to blockchain application contract code, such as the value field via the Solidity code msg.value. The new extended crosschain transaction fields are made available to blockchain application contract code via a precompile contract.
All nodes that process the transaction check that the Coordination Blockchain Id, Crosschain Coordination Contract, Crosschain Transaction Time-out, Crosschain Transaction Id, and Originating Blockchain Id are consistent across the transaction or view they are processing, and the nested Subordinate Transactions and Views. The nodes also check that the To address and From Address, and the blockchain identifier obtained from the V field and the From Blockchain Id match across transactions and views.
The To address is the address of the contract containing the function called on a blockchain. For example, the function (f1) in contract (c1) could call a function (f2) in another contract (c2) on the same blockchain (b1). The second contract (c2) could call a function (f3) in a contract (c3) on another blockchain (b2) via a Subordinate Transaction. The From Address of the Subordinate Transaction will match the To address of the transaction on the first blockchain (b1). This will be the address first contract (c1). It will however, not match the address of the second contract (c2), which is the function that caused the Subordinate Transaction to be triggered. The Subordinate Transaction for Blockchain D is trial executed. There are no Subordinate Transactions or Views for the transaction that need to be dispatched. The transaction is mined. When the transaction has been included in a block, the updated state is stored in provisional state, the contract is locked, and the nodes on Blockchain D cooperate to threshold sign a Ready message, indicating that the blockchain is ready to commit the Atomic Crosschain Transaction. The message is submitted to the Coordinating Node.
When the Coordinating Node (on Blockchain A) has received Ready messages for Blockchain B and D, and the Originating Transaction has been mined, then the nodes on Blockchain A then cooperate to threshold sign a Commit message. This message is uploaded to the Coordination Contract on the Coordination Blockchain. Assuming this message is uploaded prior to the time-out, the Crosschain Transaction is then in the commit state.
The Coordinating Node requests that nodes on other Blockchains commit a Signalling Transaction. When a node on a blockchain encounters a Signalling Transaction for a certain Crosschain Transaction, it checks the Coordination Contract for the Crosschain Transaction to check to see if the transaction should be committed or ignored. If the transaction is to be committed, then all contract provisional state related to the transaction is converted to normal state, unlocking the contracts. If the transaction is to be ignored, then the contract provisional state is discarded and the contract state is updated, unlocking the contracts.
B. Failure Cases
If an error is detected then nodes on Blockchain A can cooperate to create a threshold signed Ignore message which is uploaded to the Coordination Contract to indicate to all nodes that the Crosschain Transaction should be abandoned, all provisional state updates should be discarded and contracts should be unlocked. If an Ignore message can not be created, or if the Crosschain Transaction times-out, then the state returned by the Coordination Contract indicates the Crosschain Transaction should be abandoned.
When nodes on each blockchain first become a part of a Crosschain Transaction, they set a timer to expire when they expect the Crosschain Transaction to time-out, plus a random additional wait period. The timer is cancelled when a Signalling Transaction is received. If a node's timer expires prior to receiving a Signalling Transaction, the node checks the Coordination Contract and then creates and submits a Signalling Transaction to indicate to other nodes that the updates should be committed or ignored, and that the contract should be unlocked. The additional random wait period is used so that all nodes on the blockchain don't simultaneously send Signalling Transactions.
IV. APPLICATION DEVELOPMENT

A. Design for Locking
Contracts that have state updated as part of a crosschain transaction are locked. Calls to those locked contracts will fail until they are unlocked. Traditional contracts that hold registries of information, which may need to be accessed by many users at the same time, such as ERC 20 contracts, need to be refactored to work successfully in a crosschain scenario. They should be restructured such that there is a non-lockable router contract that determines the appropriate lockable item contract. Fig 8 shows how an ERC 20 contract could be refactored. Each account could have one or more lockable ERC 20 Payment Slot contracts. The non-lockable ERC 20 Router contract's code could be written such that transfers are sent from an account's payment slot contract that isn't locked which has adequate funds to a payment slot for the destination account that is not currently locked. In this way, multiple payments may be executed in parallel.
B. Application Level Authentication
As with traditional Ethereum transactions, the type of application level authentication required for a Crosschain Transaction will be application dependent.
1) No Authentication: Many functions will need no authentication at all. That is, functions can be designed such that it is safe to execute a transaction or return results of a view to any caller who is able to access the function. 2) Using msg.sender or tx.origin: From the perspective of each Originating Transaction, Subordinate Transaction or View, msg.sender and tx.origin operate in the same way as a standard Ethereum transaction. That is, if an EOA submitted a transaction that called a function in contract A that then called a function in contract B on the same blockchain, msg.sender for contract B is contract A, and is the EOA for contract A. In both cases tx.origin would be the EOA. In the context of a node processing an Originating Transaction, Subordinate Transaction or View, for the purposes of msg.sender and tx.origin, the transaction or view appears as a separately signed transaction. Given the similarities with standard Ethereum, msg.sender and tx.origin could be used in the same way as standard Ethereum to authenticate which EOA or contract on the same blockchain called a function call using code similar to that shown in Listing 2.
Listing 2: Checking msg.sender 1 function receiver() external { 2 require(msg.sender == authorisedAddress); 3 ...
}
A key difference between standard Ethereum views and Subordinate Views is that Subordinate Views are signed. As such, the variables msg.sender and tx.origin can be used within Subordinate Views, whereas they are not set in the context of normal Ethereum views (except for the case of msg.sender when one contract calls another contract).
3) From Blockchain Id, From Address, and Originating Blockchain Id: If a contract needs to only respond to calls from a certain contract on a certain blockchain, then the code in Listing 3 should be used. The code checks that the From Blockchain Id and From Address match the authorised blockchain and address, and checks that the blockchains represented by From Blockchain Id and Originating Blockchain Id are semi-trusted. By semi-trusted it is meant that fewer than M validators operating the blockchain are Byzantine. Note that this scenario implies the contract should allow for any msg.sender and tx.origin. address fromAddr = infoPrecompile(FROM_ADDR); 3 uint256 fromBcId = infoPrecompile(FROM_BCID); 4 uint256 origBcId = infoPrecompile(ORIG_BCID); 5 require(fromAddr == authorisedFromAddress); 6 require(fromBcId == authorisedFromBcId); 7 require(origBcId == authorisedOrigBcId); 8
... 9 } V. ANALYSIS Typically, any desired property of a distributed system can be expressed as a combination of safety and liveness properties. Similarly, the atomicity property of the atomic crosschain protocol can also be seen as a combination of safety and liveness properties. In general, the safety property captures the notion that bad states are not reachable, and the liveness property captures the notion that good states are eventually reached. For atomicity, the safety property translates to: when the protocol finishes, the whole crosschain transaction gets either committed or rolled back, the liveness property states that: the atomic crosschain transaction protocol eventually (after finite amount of time) terminates. We present a more formal discussion here.
Limit on the number of Byzantine nodes. Consensus protocols invariably has a limit on the number of Byzantine nodes in a network. For example, proof-of-work protocol requires the number of Byzantine nodes to be less than half of the total number of nodes. Similarly, IBFT and IBFT2 protocols have a limit of one-third the total number of nodes. Because our atomic crosschain protocol is built on top of consensus protocols, we require and assume that the conditions for the correct operation of the consensus protocols are met. In other words, we inherit the same limit on the number of Byzantine nodes from the dependant consensus protocol.
Theorem 1 (Safety). Suppose that the atomic crosschain protocol has finished executing a crosschain transaction c. Then:
• if c succeeds then the protocol successfully commits the state updates of all the associated (originating and subordinate) transactions, • if c fails then the protocol rolls back the state updates of all the associated transactions.
Proof. We prove by case analysis of all possible states of the crosschain transaction c recorded in the coordination contract.
• not-started This is possible only if c fails before the state of the coordination contract is updated to started. At this point neither the Originating Transaction nor the Subordinate Transactions has started to execute. Hence there is nothing to rollback. • started We show that this situation is not possible. The coordination contract has received the start message from the originating chain, but not the commit or ignore message. Based on the time-out specified in the start message, the nodes on the originating chain start their respective local timers, after processing the Originating Transaction. Similarly, the nodes on the subordinate chains start local timers after processing their respective Subordinate Transactions. After the timers expire, the nodes look up the state of c in the coordination contract. In case of any failure in processing the Originating Transaction or in one of the Subordinate Transactions, the originating chain would have updated the coordination contract to ignored state. Also, the state of the coordination contract is updated to ignored state when there is a time-out. So, when c is processed (either successfully or not) the state of c in coordination contract can only end up in committed or ignored, after having been in the started state. • committed It means that the coordination contract received the threshold signed commit message from the originating chain. After submitting the commit message, originating blockchain's coordinating node messages all the validators in its chain and other coordinating nodes on the Subordinate Transaction blockchains to check the state of the coordination contract. If it is Byzantine, then the local timers on the nodes (of all participating chains) expire and the nodes look up the coordination contract for the state of c, and find that c is committed. They then commit their local provisional states. Hence the whole transaction c is committed. • ignored This is possible when either the coordinating node on the originating chain has sent an ignore message, or c has timed out, and the coordination contract updates the state of c to be ignored. Nodes will commit or roll back their provisional states only after looking up the coordination contract. In this case all nodes on all participating chains roll back their updates, implying that the whole crosschain transaction c is rolled back.
Theorem 2 (Liveness). Suppose the atomic crosschain protocol is started, meaning, a crosschain transaction is submitted to a coordinating node on the originating blockchain. Then, the atomic crosschain protocol protocol will eventually (after a finite number of steps) finish.
Proof. The intuition of the proof is simple. The protocol itself has a finite number of steps. Also, as the start message is submitted, all validator nodes on all participating chains start their local timer. This ensures that the whole transaction will time out eventually, in case there are indefinite delays. We consider the special case when the crashing (or becoming Byzantine) of nodes might prevent the protocol from terminating. The crashing of other nodes are governed by the dependant consensus protocol. Hence we assume that we always have a minimum number of nodes to be non-Byzantine as dictated by the consensus protocol. We examine if crashing a coordinating node introduces indefinite waits, which implies that the protocol does not terminate.
• Suppose the coordinating node on the originating chain crashes before submitting the crosschain transaction start message to the coordination contract. Then no other chain knows about this crosschain transaction and this transaction is terminated and deemed to have failed. • Suppose the coordinating node on the originating chain crashes after submitting the start message but before submitting the commit message, then the whole transaction times out. The local timers on validator nodes of the originating blockchain time out, look up the coordination contract, find the transaction is ignored, and abort the transaction. The subordinate chains complete the execution of views or transactions and send their Subordinate Transaction ready messages to the coordinating node of the originating chain. Because the coordinating node of originating chain has crashed, they observe that the state of the coordinating contract is never changed to committed, and the validator nodes on all participating chains will eventually time out, look up the coordination contract (which is set to ignored after time out), and abort the transaction. • Suppose the coordinating node on originating chain crashes after submitting the crosschain transaction commit message to the coordination contract. Then (validator nodes on) all chains see the committed state of coordinating contract and will commit the transaction. • Suppose the coordinating node on a subordinate chain crashes. Then it cannot send the Subordinate Transaction ready message to the originating chain. The coordinating node on the originating chain keeps waiting and times out. The coordination contract gets updated to ignored state and the transaction terminates and is rolled back.
Establishing the liveness property is very useful as it implies the properties of termination and deadlock-free.
VI. CONCLUSION
Atomic Crosschain Transactions allow application developers to create complex cross-blockchain applications in a straightforward manner. It does this by absorbing the vast majority of the complexity required to deliver this behaviour using a novel combination of technologies.
